



# US Government Concerns: Foreign Influence on Research

# National Institutes of Health

- [Dear Colleague Letter](#) from Francis Collins (8/20/18)
  - Diversion of intellectual property
  - Sharing of confidential information on grant applications
  - Failure to disclose actual or potential conflicts
- [ACD Working Group for Foreign Influences on Research Integrity](#) (12/13/18)
  - Excerpt from the Executive Summary (pp. 5-6)

“Unfortunately, some foreign governments have initiated systematic programs to unduly influence and capitalize on U.S.-conducted research, including that funded by NIH. As members of these programs, small numbers of foreign scientists have committed serious violations of NIH’s policies and systems. Issues identified by NIH include not disclosing foreign financial conflicts; not fully and accurately disclosing other financial support during grant application, award, and implementation processes; and not disclosing conflicts of commitment. In some instances, foreign scientists have failed to disclose other affiliations and positions that often come with resources and equities. Finally, NIH has seen peer review violations that range in severity.”
  - Recommendation Themes
    - Communication and Awareness
    - Risk Mitigation
    - Monitoring, Actions, and Consequences

# Department of Defense

- [National Defense Authorization Act 2018](#)
  - Prohibition on Use of Products and Services Developed or Provided by Kaspersky Lab (Sec. 1634)
- [National Defense Authorization Act 2019](#)
  - Process to Limit Foreign Access to Technology (Sec. 885)
  - Prohibition of Covered Telecommunications Equipment or Services (Sec. 887)
    - See, definition (Sec. 889)
  - Initiative to Support Protection of National Security Academic Researchers from Undue Influence and Other Security Threats (Sec. 1286)

# Department of Energy

- [Deputy Secretary of Energy Memo](#) (12/14/18)
  - Possible List: [SLAC Travel - Sensitive Countries List](#) (March 2018)
- [Deputy Secretary of Energy Memo](#) (1/31/19) - **Immediate Policy Changes**
  - Foreign national's CVs will be required in each Foreign Visits and Assignments (FV&A) request to the DOE national laboratory complex and in the Foreign Access Central Tracking System (FACTS) database. Must include all specialties, all work positions with no gaps, current/accurate names of all academic institutions attended.
  - SCFNs are prohibited from conducting FV&A on listed research areas. Exemption process provided.
  - SCFN will undergo enhanced vetting prior to approval of FV&A
  - Notice of senior level SCFN visits and SCFN journalists will be provided to FOAB at least two weeks prior.
  - SC FV&A within DOE national laboratory complex will be prohibited where risk cannot be effectively assessed or mitigated
  - DOE official foreign travel will be generally prohibited when it involves a country or technology identified in the S&T Risk Matrix

# Federal Bureau of Investigation

- FBI Publications on China Threats ([Infragard](#) portal) – 12 recent publications



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**CHINA: THE RISK TO ACADEMIA**

As of March 2018, more than 1.4 million international students and professors were participating in America's open and collaborative academic environment. The inclusion of these international scholars at U.S. colleges and universities entails both substantial benefit—and notable risk. Many of these visitors contribute to the impressive successes and achievements enjoyed by these institutions, which produce advanced research, cutting-edge technology, and insightful scholarship. However, this open environment also puts academia at risk for exploitation by foreign actors who do not follow our rules or share our values.

**The annual cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets is**  
**\$225–\$600 BILLION**



Questions?